



THE NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

Reviewing Stand

EVANSTON, ILLINOIS

Illinois U Library

Are We Losing the Cold War in Europe?

A radio discussion over WGN and the Mutual Broadcasting System

CAPTAIN MICHAEL FIELDING

Author, Lecturer and Commentator

KENNETH E. OLSON

Dean, The Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University

FRANKLIN D. SCOTT

Professor of History, Northwestern University

Moderator: JAMES H. MCBURNEY

Dean, The School of Speech, Northwestern University

Broadcast continuously since 1934 by Northwestern University



THE REVIEWING STAND is a weekly radio forum presented by Northwestern University. The program was first broadcast by Station WGN, Chicago, October 14, 1934. It has been on the air continuously since that time, originating in the WGN studios, and, since 1935, carried by the stations of the Mutual Broadcasting System. THE REVIEWING STAND presents members of the Northwestern University faculty and distinguished guests from business, government, education, and the press in round table discussions of contemporary problems—the questions that are in the news. The program is under the direction of James H. McBurney, Dean of the School of Speech, Northwestern University and Miss Myrtle Stahl, Director of Educational Programs, WGN, Chicago.

The Northwestern University Reviewing Stand, published weekly beginning May 2, 1943, by the Offices of the Director of Radio (Public Relations), Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois. Entered as second class matter at the Post Office, Evanston, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1875. Subscription price, \$1.00 for 16 weeks, \$2.00 for 32 weeks, \$2.50 for one year. Single copies, ten cents.

Are We Losing the Cold

War in Europe?

MR. MCBURNEY: Are we losing the cold war in Europe?

MR. FIELDING: No, I would say we are winning the cold war in Europe. But in saying that, I would also like to point out that the cold war is a global war, and that we are losing it in Asia.

MR. OLSON: We are winning the war in Europe. The success of the Berlin air lift first, and now the Marshall Aid which is rebuilding the economy of the war-devastated nations is cutting the bottom out from under Communism in Western Europe.

MR. SCOTT: Our success is real, but temporary. Long run success is being jeopardized by our internal political squabbles and social antagonisms.

* * *

What Is Cold War?

MR. MCBURNEY: What do you mean by the cold war, Fielding?

MR. FIELDING: Well, the cold war essentially, of course, is a competitive sale of two antagonistic ideological political philosophies. But in Russia's case this ideological assault against the democratic position is supplemented by a campaign of physical pressure which the Russians bring to bear either directly or indirectly on the so-called strategic areas all over the world, areas which are vital to bases that we would have to dominate if we ever were to win another shooting war.

MR. MCBURNEY: Do you go along with that, Scott?

MR. SCOTT: I should think, Fielding, that really the essential thing is the power conflict and that the ideological conflict between Communism and democracy is secondary so far as a cold war and a potential hot war are concerned.

MR. FIELDING: Scott, I don't think you can actually divorce the two. I think the economic aspects of the cold war

and the military aspects of the cold war are so closely integrated, you cannot tell one from the other.

MR. MCBURNEY: What is your opinion on this, Olson?

MR. OLSON: Let us get down to essentials. Russia with its tremendous resources and its military might could overrun Europe now within a few weeks and we could not stop her, but Russia must have time to consolidate its power and the newly acquired areas, must rebuild its internal economy, its industry and transportation, must develop atom bombs before it will risk war. Now, that is giving us just a little time to build up enough military and economic strength in Western Europe to make Russia hesitate to make war.

MR. FIELDING: May I add here, Olson, that in my opinion at least, there isn't the slightest chance of Russia's going to a shooting war at the present time. There are two good reasons for that:

First of all, her industrial setup is such that the Russians are anywhere from two to five years from having rebuilt their industrial plant and brought their plant to a point where it could actually support the drain of a world war.

Russia and Satellites

Number two, the Russians are having, as you know, a great deal of trouble with their so-called puppet allies in the Balkans, and until such time as they bring those allies back into line as allies, it would be suicidal for the Russians to launch themselves into a hot war that they would be bound to lose.

MR. MCBURNEY: How firm is Russia's position in Eastern Europe with these satellite nations, Scott? I am thinking of Czechoslovakia, Finland, Yugoslavia.

MR. SCOTT: In some of those countries it looks very firm, indeed. Of course, in the other definitely satellite countries it has been for a long time. For the last 18 months it has been firm in Czechoslovakia, and Czechs who have opposed the regime have simply had to leave. Tito looks as if in Yugoslavia he might possibly break away.

MR. FIELDING: I am afraid, Scott, I am going to have to contradict you on that point.

I was in Yugoslavia last year. I didn't go in with a passport or visas. I went in without papers. I went in with fake papers. I saw Yugoslavia as few outsiders see it. And I can assure you in spite of Tito's resistance to Moscow, there isn't the slightest chance of Tito or Yugoslavia breaking away from the Russian camp and joining the democracies—not the slightest!

MR. OLSON: The only comfort we can get out of the present situation in Yugoslavia is that it is giving Russia pause. She is having to stop to consolidate her position there.

MR. FIELDING: Right you are there, Olson.

MR. OLSON: I would like to take issue on another thing, that this is only economic, not ideological.

Vishinsky yesterday talked about Stalin's having made a statement that he wanted to live in peace with the rest of the nations back in 1934. But in '47—as late as '47—Stalin reiterated the statement of all the Communists that wars are inevitable so long as the capitalist system exists, that only the destruction of the capitalist states and the conquest of the world for Communism can produce peace.

'Ideologies Tools for Power'

MR. SCOTT: I would agree with Fielding to this extent, Olson: it is almost impossible to try to divorce the power conflict and the ideological conflict. I would simply say that the ideologies are being used as tools through which the war of power is being fought.

But there is one other of these countries in Eastern Europe that we

haven't mentioned. Whatever may be the situation in Czechoslovakia, and whatever may be the possibilities in Yugoslavia, one of the interesting countries there on the eastern border between the West and the East is Finland. And Finland, while seemingly under the Russian shadow, is one of the countries which most definitely stands ideologically and in interest with the West.

MR. FIELDING: I would like to attempt to explain the difference between Finland and Czechoslovakia.

Russian Methods

In order to understand that difference you have got to understand the methods by which Russia takes over countries. The first thing they do is to infiltrate into the government of that country if they can, and then they go after two major portfolios: the ministry of the interior, which gives them control over the police, and ministry of defense which gives them control over the army. Once they are in that position it is only a matter of time. In Czechoslovakia they have achieved that. In Finland, the Finns have seen to it that the Communists don't get control in those two critical ministries, and therefore the Finns have been able to resist being taken over by Soviet Russia.

MR. SCOTT: But it has been touch and go even in Finland, and for a time there was a Communist minister of the interior, Leino, who had charge of the police, but the city police and the army remained under Finnish control. And the Finns were watching Leino every minute.

One of the common phrases one hears over there is, "We are not Czechs." In the spring of 1948 when they were debating what they should do about the Russian demand for a mutual assistance pact, they told themselves again and again—it cannot and it will not happen here because we know the Russian enemy; we know their methods of infiltration; we know how they attempt to create chaos; we will not let it happen.

And it is because of that knowledge of theirs more than anything else that they have been able to prevent the kind of thing which happened in Czechoslovakia. It happened in Czechoslovakia against the will of the majority of the people, but it could happen because the people were not sufficiently aware. In Finland they were aware.

MR. FIELDING: That is right. And may I also add this to what I have said before. As long as a country can resist being taken over originally she always has a chance to continue saving herself, because once a country has been taken over, once the Communists get control, then you see the kind of police system that the Communist totalitarian powers impose upon a nation makes it absolutely impossible for mass opposition to organize. Without organized mass opposition that opposition must remain impotent.

MR. OLSON: Let's get back to this cold war. We Western nations desire peace and we had hoped to live after the war in peace with Russia. I think the Russian people, too, desire peace, but their masters in the Kremlin led by a dictatorship more absolute than Hitler are driven by this implacable aim for Communism. We didn't wake up until after Communism had engulfed nine European countries, and then we were driven to this policy of trying to contain Russian expansionism.

Communism vs. Capitalism?

MR. MCBURNEY: Is this a case of Communism versus capitalism, or is it just another case of power politics of the sort we have faced for hundreds of years?

MR. SCOTT: I think it is a case of power politics of the kind we have faced for hundreds of years, only the setting and the pattern is different. It is always different. When the balance of power concept first came into our language . . . if not into our politics . . . it was a case of a number of states protecting themselves against the hegemony of one great state. In the late 19th century the balance of power

concept became instead a balance between three states of comparatively equal power against another three states of comparatively equal power, but there was still a balancing and juggling.

Now, since World War II we are in a position where there are only two great power centers in the world. There isn't even any secondary power in the world, but only third and fourth-rate powers after these two great ones. And the attempt to balance, to readjust power between these two great power centers creates a new situation.

Two Great Powers

MR. OLSON: But though we have two great powers, nevertheless we have blocs of secondary powers that are affiliated with the great ones.

MR. SCOTT: And extremely important, Olson, in the strengths of those two great power centers.

MR. OLSON: I would say this is power politics more desperate than the world has ever faced before.

MR. FIELDING: The principles of power politics as we see it played today are the same as it was played throughout history. In this particular case, as you say, we have two major powers, the United States on the one hand, Russia on the other, attempting to win the minds everywhere, each for his particular political and economic concepts.

So it doesn't make any difference whether the nature of the power political game is changed, the principles are exactly the same.

MR. SCOTT: That is correct.

MR. OLSON: Now, we as Americans have always decried this power politics, and yet we are up against something that we must face because the only argument Russia understands is power, and we have got to face her with power.

MR. MCBURNEY: Is Russia's possession of the atom bomb going to make any difference in this cold war, Captain?

MR. FIELDING: I don't think so, McBurney, not at all. It was foreseen long ago that Russia would get the atom bomb. Even if she hadn't gotten the atom bomb, she had the answer to the atom bomb, which was biological warfare.

Last year when I was in Europe I found there was very little fear of the atom bomb. The great fear of the atom bomb is here at home in the United States.

I have always been of the opinion that nobody will ever use the atom bomb again. It is one of these devastating weapons like gas, biological warfare, that has a very serious boom-erang or kick-back effect. You see, it is very difficult to protect yourself against your own atom bomb. Now with the element of retaliation introduced into the picture, I think there is far less chance of using the atom bomb than ever before.

Our Position

MR. MCBURNEY: That certainly isn't the position that is generally taken in this country. What do you think about it, Olson?

MR. OLSON: I agree with Fielding to this extent: This summer there was less war talk in Europe than there was in the United States. But now that the people know that Russia has the atom bomb, maybe 2, 3, 4 years before they expected it, I think they are going to feel the need of getting together as they did not before.

MR. SCOTT: There is going to be, in other words, an intensification of the cold war even if, as Fielding says, and we all hope, we have a permanent postponement of a hot war.

MR. MCBURNEY: We were talking earlier about Russia's position in these satellite countries, in Czechoslovakia, Finland, Yugoslavia, and many countries definitely inside the Iron Curtain. How solid is our position in Western Europe, Captain?

MR. FIELDING: I think our position is fairly solid in Western Europe because as a counter measure to the two-

tongued pact by Soviet Russia, the ideological attack supplemented by political pressure, we devised two very good weapons: the Marshall Plan on the one hand, the Truman Doctrine, on the other. And as a result of the application of these two principles to Western Europe I think we have brought Western Europe back to a point now where Communist chances of taking over are very materially reduced.

MR. SCOTT: I think that is absolutely correct. In fact, it is amazing how the Communists' strength in most of the countries of Western Europe has declined. It indicates that much of that strength wasn't really ideologically Communistic to begin with but was merely protest against the bad conditions of the immediate postwar period. We are winning economically. We are winning in the sense of military cooperation. But, it seems to me at the same time there is one way in which we are very definitely weaker now than we were four years ago in Western Europe, and that is in the minds of the people. And that is extremely important in the line-up for a future war. That is extremely important for the strength with which people will struggle for a common ideal.

'Marshall Plan An Aid?'

MR. OLSON: We must recognize the contribution of the Marshall Plan. I saw evidence of it in Europe this summer. Four years ago, after the war, the great problem in France was food. The Germans had taken all their horses off the farms; no farm machinery was available, no fertilizer, no people to work the farms, the young men were gone. They could raise very little. One coalition government after the other fell because they couldn't feed the people. The Communists cried, "Give us a chance. Vote for us, and we'll supply the food." What happened? Six million people, almost one in every three, voted for the Communists. They weren't Communist, but they were desperate for food.

Now agricultural production has been brought up through the Marshall

Aid Plan. They have food, and today the Communist support is greatly declining.

MR. FIELDING: Which generally goes to underscore the fact that economic instability plays into Russia's hands. If you have encountered starvation, as I have encountered it, you will find to a starving man political freedom has a very little appeal, but a plate of soup has a whale of a big appeal.

'Strengthen Our Democracy'

MR. SCOTT: That is undoubtedly correct. That is why I think it is important to emphasize that while we are unquestionably strengthening our position in Western Europe, we are to a certain extent weakening the democratic ideology as a tool in the conflict against the Communist ideology. We are weakening it by such things as the lynchings in the American South which are used all through the world by Communist propaganda. We are weakening it by things like the riots against Paul Robeson at Peekskill, New York, where we thought we were attempting merely to express ourselves, but some of our internal squabbles are used in the field of international propaganda against us and against the free democratic way of life.

MR. FIELDING: Yes, yes, Scott. I too, ran across that in Europe last year and in Asia this year. There is a growing contempt for what these people under the lash of Russian propaganda term our hypocrisy over here.

We pay lip service to our democratic principles, but we too often violate them, and in violating your own principles, you are merely weakening your own position. In other words, these people are far less eager to accept our word for the fact that democracy is the finest political concept in the world if we ourselves refuse to live it.

MR. OLSON: That is very true, and also don't forget the other propaganda line the Russians use. While the people of Europe generally are grateful for this Marshall Aid, there is also under-

neath this fear that we are just using economic assistance to tie the European people to a kind of American imperialism.

MR. SCOTT: Yes, one of the specific angles on that is the objection of the Norwegians to this 50 per cent clause with regard to shipping, the clause that provides that 50 per cent of the shipping of Marshall Aid goods must go in American vessels. The Norwegians, like all these other people, are glad for the aid. They need it. At the same time they are great shippers; and if they are deprived of their own means of earning money by shipping goods, then the other aid doesn't do them much good.

MR. FIELDING: Of course, Russian propaganda constantly makes a point of that. In other words, Russian propaganda tells these people, and not without a certain germ of truth, that we are using the Marshall Plan Aid in Europe to bolster our own economy. There is no question about it. There are big factions in the United States who look upon Marshall Plan Aid as a sort of dumping ground for American surpluses, etc., for additional profits to American business. And the Russians are making a great deal of hay out of that particular kind of propaganda at the present time.

Must Build Confidence

MR. OLSON: Don't forget, either, the Russians are saying, "you can't rely on these Americans. They are all right now, but wait until they get this depression which we are sure will come to the United States, then they are going to leave you high and dry. You can't trust these Americans. They are not going through with Marshall Aid Plan very long, nor does the Atlantic Pact mean anything to you."

MR. SCOTT: Yes and they might point to the delays in the ratification of the Atlantic Pact and the vagaries of Congress with regard to the American Recovery program, etc.

On the other hand, while we must recognize those facts and while we

must do everything we can to try to correct them, we must recognize that the Marshall Plan is having a tremendous success throughout Europe. Olson has mentioned the effect in France. One specific case can be cited from Denmark, where the Danes figure that every \$1 of ERP aid means \$4 worth of increased production. Now if that kind of pump priming can go on, then Western Europe can be rebuilt.

MR. FIELDING: I wonder if we can't all agree on this one point, and I think we can: The Marshall Plan has succeeded in achieving its prime purpose of preventing Western Europe from going into Russia's hands.

Western Europe Improving?

Let me give you a few figures. Mr. Paul Hoffman, who as you all know is head of ECA, came out a short time ago in Battle Creek, Michigan with some interesting figures on production. He said, for instance, that the Marshall Plan, after 18 months of operation was way ahead of schedule, that in his opinion by 1952 Western European countries would be able to stand on their own feet. He showed that "over-all production in the recipient nations is now 15 per cent above prewar levels," and that in Britain, "British production is 50 per cent higher" than prewar levels. And I think you mentioned, Olson, in France it is 30 per cent over prewar levels. This is a very good sign.

MR. OLSON: You learn from French industrialists and government people that their total production—coal, steel, manufacturing—this year is going to equal 1929, which was the best year in French history, and will be 30 per cent ahead of what it was in 1939 prewar.

MR. MCBURNEY: The Marshall Plan is certainly one of our big guns in this cold war. I take it, the Truman Doctrine to which you referred earlier, Fielding, is the second big gun. Tell us about that.

MR. FIELDING: I think the Truman

Doctrine is the first big gun, because the Truman Doctrine is achieving something that too many of us overlook. While we are trying to bring the world to our way of thinking and we are trying to aid them to get on their own economic feet, the Russians are going behind our backs and doing something that could be very disastrous in the long run. They are trying through political pressures in the strategic areas to rob us of our bases. While we are winning the cold war in Europe, while American eyes are focused on the Berlin air lift and the Western European countries, the Russians went behind their backs and took over China. Now actually China's loss is tragic enough, but the repercussions are disastrous through Southeast Asia where Communism is making rapid strides. I am almost ready to write off all of Southeast Asia at the present time. Now if we lose all our bases, you see, and even if we bring these Western European nations back to a point where they can stand on their own feet, then we have lost not only the cold war, but we have lost any chance of winning the shooting war, because military power as such is valueless unless you can bring it to bear against our enemy. And for that we need bases all over the world.

The Truman Doctrine

MR. SCOTT: I think it is interesting that the Truman Doctrine is a very broad thing and didn't refer particularly to Europe though the immediate problem was Greece and Turkey. . . .

MR. FIELDING: And China.

MR. SCOTT: In March of 1947 it was announced. The Doctrine speaks in broad and general terms, in really global terms. In essence, to use Truman's own words, what it amounts to is this: "It must be the foreign policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minority or by outside pressures."

Now that brief quotation from the Truman Doctrine itself indicates how the thinking was in terms of both

economic upbuilding and military defense. And we have used both those means to implement the Truman Doctrine in the two and one-half years since its declaration.

MR. FIELDING: Its purpose is mainly military. In other words, you have had your extension of the Truman Doctrine to Greece and Turkey. You are now in process of extending Truman Doctrine principles to the Western European base through the North Atlantic Security Pact. We applied the Truman Doctrine in our aid to Chiang-Kaishek, and so forth. So you see, the Truman Doctrine is very important.

Military Balance of Power

MR. OLSON: Mainly military, yes, but first it had to be economic. And that is where the Marshall Aid Plan was the first step in strengthening Europe so that there could be military strength later on.

MR. FIELDING: There is very little of the economic in building up Greece's army and counseling Greece's army against Communists, and aiding and supporting and building up the Turkish army, and aiding and supporting Chiang-Kaishek's army. That is military.

MR. SCOTT: That is true, and yet in Western Europe perhaps the major problem is economic, even if we are thinking primarily in military terms.

MR. FIELDING: Let's say the first necessary step is economic, but now that the economic problems have been . . . or are on the way to solution, let's say . . . we now do have to set up a military balance of power in Europe to prevent the Russians from taking over by force.

MR. SCOTT: Certainly.

MR. OLSON: Let's get in this point, too. Though this Doctrine was announced two and one-half years ago, it was a year after that before the American people were awake to what this problem was, before we could go ahead with the Marshall Aid Plan as a first step.

MR. FIELDING: And it took the taking over of Czechoslovakia to awaken them.

MR. OLSON: That's right—not only in America but in Europe, too.

MR. SCOTT: When the Truman Doctrine was first announced it was very unpopular at home and abroad, but within a year after it was first announced, events like the demand of Russia on Finland and like the coup in Czechoslovakia convinced people pretty generally that this kind of policy was absolutely necessary.

MR. FIELDING: Unfortunately, you see, while we have recognized the policy of committing our dollars, as we have in Greece and Western Europe, etc., we have not yet opened our eyes to the fact that there are certain situations as in China where the manpower may have to be American manpower, and there is one rude awakening that is going to come to the American people in the next few months—it will have to be American manpower in many parts of the world which will have to be committed.

How Win Cold War?

MR. MCBURNEY: By way of summary, let me ask how could we prosecute this cold war more successfully? Let's have your recommendations, Scott.

MR. SCOTT: I think we should continue our present policy, but we should not lead our allies to expect more than we will deliver. Congress should speed up its process of making decisions. Every citizen should realize that his words and actions represent the United States and democracy, and that to win in this conflict of interests and ideology throughout the world we must prove that American democracy really is the best form of society.

We should not remain in a weak defensive position, but take a positive and affirmative stand.

MR. OLSON: While I agree this is a global war and do not gainsay the importance of Asia, nevertheless the

United States must not for one minute slacken its efforts to strengthen our allies in the West, for though Russia has for the moment eased its pressures in that area, she has not given up. They will continue to press their advantage, and if she should overcome Europe we would have an arsenal that would make our position impossible.

MR. FIELDING: My point is that we could win the war in Europe and lose the war in Asia, and lose it because in my opinion, and in the opinion of other military authorities, the loss of the war in Asia would inevitably mean

the loss of the entire war because this is a global war. All the bases from which we would actually strike the vitals of Russia happen to be in the Near East and Far East because their concentrations are in Central Asia.

MR. MCBURNEY: It is heartening to know that you men take an optimistic view of our position in Western Europe.

We seem to be agreed that the cold war in Europe is closely related to that in Asia, and Captain Fielding, at least, takes a rather pessimistic view of our position in Asia. We shall look into that question next week.

Suggested Readings



Compiled by Barbara Wynn, Assistant,
Reference Department, Deering
Library, Northwestern University



ELIOT, G. F. *If Russia Strikes*. Indianapolis, Bobbs, 1949.

The author, convinced that we are in danger of an immediate war, outlines what we should do to win it.

GUNTHER, JOHN. *Behind the Curtain*. New York, Harper's, 1948.

Observations on vital areas inside Europe today.

STERNBERG, FRITZ. *How to Stop the Russians Without War*. (Translated from the German by Ralph Manheim), New York, J. Day Co., 1948.

States that American encouragement of economic and political reform in Europe and Asia can win a successful political war against the Russians, assuring peace for many years.

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 263:165-79, My., '49. "Soviet Policy in Germany." FRANZ L. NEUMANN.

Tells why neither Russia nor the West can be said to have won the battle for postwar Germany.

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 263:152-64, My., '49. "Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe." C. E. BLACK.

Describes the causes and results of Russia's policy of active intervention in Eastern Europe.

Atlantic 184:22-27, Jl., '49. "What Kind of War?" H. W. BALDWIN.

A discussion of what our objectives should be in both the cold war and in an actual war. Maintains that the atomic bomb can't stop the Red army and tells what can.

Harper's 198:21-3, Ap., '49. "Cold Peace; Outline for an Unwritten Book." D. BERNSTEIN.

Declares that the United States holds the advantage in the present European stalemate, but that the only hope for real peace lies in the strengthening of international government.

Harper's 198:34-8, Je., '49. "Defense of Western Europe, Deception or Blunder?" J. P. WARBURG.

Maintains that the Soviet leaders' real concern with Western Europe is primarily to prevent the building of a springboard for an attack against Russia. *Nation* 168:549-51, My. 14, '49. "Botch on the Rhine." CAROLUS.

An assertion that the West German state will not prove to be the bulwark against Russian aggression that it was expected to be.

Nation 168:5-7, Je. 2, '49. "Greece: Prescription for Peace." J. A. SOFIANO-POULUS.

Concludes that in spite of more than two years of the Truman Doctrine, the road is being paved for Communism in Greece.

Nation 168:408-9, Ap. 9, '49. "The Pact is Obsolete." D. ROUSSET.

The most effective strategy against Stalin would be a radical transformation of social conditions in Western Europe.

New Republic 121:5-6, Ag. 15, '49. "Should We Arm Europe?"

Declares that the people of Europe, conditioned by defeat, are barely willing to defend their native frontiers; they have no intention of fighting to defend a strategic plan, or even an Atlantic Pact.

New York Times Magazine p. 11+, My., '49. "Is a Settlement with Russia Possible?" E. CRANKSHAW.

A discussion of Russia's apparent aims in Europe and of the tactics used in achieving them.

Survey 85:304-7, Je., '49. "Where is Europe Going?" V. M. DEAN.

Declares that the influence of the United States in Europe would be greatly enhanced if we would clarify our attitude toward Russia and Communism. We are right in opposing political dictatorship, but we should make it clear that we do not oppose social reform.

United States Department of State Bulletin 20:633-5, My. 15, '49. "U. S. Foreign Policy and the North Atlantic Pact." J. E. PEURIFOY.

Discusses the importance of the Atlantic Pact and military assistance in insuring peace in Europe.

United States News 27:38-9, Ag. 5, '49. "Start of World War III?" D. LAWRENCE.

Denounces President Truman's arms program for Europe as a definite threat to further peaceful relations between Russia and the United States.

United States News 27:11-12, Sept. 16, '49. "Tito vs. Stalin's Dictatorship: Defeat for Soviet Communism."

Tells what the Western powers hope to gain through helping Tito.

United States News 13-15, Ag. 5, '49. "U. S., World Arsenal."

A description of how President Truman's arms plan would work.

Have you read these Reviewing Stand transcripts?

Available for 10 cents in coin.

The United Nations and the Cold War

Vol. XI, No. 16

How Will the North Atlantic Pact Affect Us?

Vol. XIII, No. 2

A list of more than 100 Reviewing Stand discussions of the past two years is now available free of charge. A postal card to the Reviewing Stand, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois will bring you this list by return mail.



Have You Read These Reviewing Stand Transcripts?

*List of all available Reviewing Stand
discussions on request*

Volume XII of THE REVIEWING STAND

- | | |
|--|---|
| 10. Should Yellow Oleomargarine Be Prohibited in Commerce? | 18. What Is Happening to Music in America? |
| 11. What Can We Do About Old Age? | 19. What Sort of Labor Law Should We Have? |
| 12. Science—Promise or Threat to the Future? | 20. What Do Science and Philosophy Mean to Your Life? |
| 13. When Does Juvenile Delinquency Lead to Serious Crime? | 21. Why Vacations? |
| 14. Should We Pass Laws to Curb Communism? | 22. Are You Looking for a Job—Or a Better Job? |
| 15. The Meaning of Easter in a Modern World. | 23. What Is Happening in China? |
| 16. Is World Government Possible Now? | 24. How Can You Make Your Marriage a Success? |
| 17. Can We Achieve Mental Health in a Push-Button World? | 25. The Meaning of the Hoover Report. |
| | 26. Watch Your Language! |

VOLUME XIII of THE REVIEWING STAND

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. What Do Our Teen-Agers Think of America's Future? | Child? |
| 2. How Will the North Atlantic Pact Affect Us? | 7. What Is Happening to the American Theatre? |
| 3. Our 81st Congress. | 8. Goethe—200 Years Ago and Today. |
| 4. What Is Happening to American Literature? | 9. How Should We Educate for Business and Industry? |
| 5. Will the New Housing Bill Clear Our Slums? | 10. Cancer and Your Life. |
| 6. How Do the Comics Affect Your | 11. Labor, Management and the Law. |

THE REVIEWING STAND

Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois

- ☐ I enclose \$1 for a 16-week subscription
☐ I enclose \$2 for a 32-week subscription
☐ I enclose \$2.50 for a 52-week subscription
 (Single copies are available at 10 cents each.)

Name

Address

City State